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Abstract
We investigate how the prescribing behavior of physicians reacts to scientific information and recom-
mendations released by public authorities. Taking the example of antidepressant drugs, we use French
panel data on exhaustive prescriptions made by a representative sample of general practitioners to more
than 110,000 depressed patients between 2000 and 2008. New results revealing an increase in suicidal
thinking among children taking selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) were reported in 2004
and prompted the release of new guidelines by public health authorities. We identify the effect of this
unexpected warning on physicians’ drug choices while addressing that possibility that patient hetero-
geneity may be correlated with unobserved physician characteristics. While the warning decreased the
average probability of prescribing SSRIs, we find that physicians’ responses to the warning were very
heterogeneous and larger if the physician had a higher preference for prescribing SSRIs before the warning.
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1 Introduction
Understanding physicians’ prescribing behavior is important for public health and public finance. Physician
prescription activity depends on physicians’ judgment and continuous updating of their medical knowledge
through scientific information and the public recommendations of health authorities. Moreover, prescription
of treatments to patients is a difficult and partially subjective choice that implies cost-benefit trade-offs
depending on drug efficacy, patient condition and the evaluation of both by the physician.
Using an important medical information change disseminated through a public warning by health author-
ities, we study whether and how recommendations affect physicians’ decision-making, using the example of
antidepressant drugs in France. We use panel data covering 2000 to 2008 and containing exhaustive prescrip-
tions made by a representative sample of 386 general practitioners to more than 110,000 depressed patients.
We identify changes in the prescribing behavior of physicians after the release of a warning in relation to new
scientific evidence on the efficacy and side effects of antidepressants during that period. As medical journals
publish new evidence and public health authorities adjust their recommendations, doctors may update their
prescribing behavior. During the study period, important new evidence on antidepressants’ efficacy and side
effects were published and transmitted through new official recommendations to physicians. There were new
results in 2004 showing that using selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) for depression treatment
increases suicidal thinking in children. After such events and medical warnings, physicians must update their
beliefs on different drug treatments and may react differently to these warnings.
We develop a model of prescribing behavior with physician and patient heterogeneity and show how we can
identify the effect of a warning on individual physicians’ specific preferences when unobserved heterogeneity
in patients’ health state may be correlated with physicians’ heterogeneity. Such a correlation could be the
result of endogenous matching on unobservable characteristics between physicians and patients. Assuming
stable preferences of physicians during the periods before and after the warning, we can assess whether the
heterogeneity in treatments is due to unobservable differences in patient or physician preferences (on drug
efficacy or side effects, for example). We are able to test not only whether changing scientific information
affects physicians’ prescriptions but also whether it affects physicians differently.
Our empirical results show that physicians’ behavior is very heterogeneous in terms of propensity to
prescribe different kinds of antidepressants and that government warnings also have very heterogeneous
effects on physicians’ prescribing behavior. We find that physicians prescribe antidepressants to children and
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adolescents less often after the warning, but many still do not adhere to to the recommendation. SSRIs are
still prescribed to this age group by 62% of physicians, despite the warning advising against this. We observe
that prescription of SSRIs to children and adolescents decrease in favor of either serotonin and norepinephrine
reuptake inhibitors (SNRIs) or drugs other than antidepressants. We also find that after the warning, the
probability of prescribing an SSRI to young adults, adults and elderly people responds very heterogeneously
across physicians. It seems that some physicians interpret the warning as “good” or “bad” news for age groups
other than children and adolescents as well. Finally, we also evaluate the substitution of SSRIs towards other
drug categories that would result from a ban on rather than a warning against prescribing SSRI drugs to
children and adolescents. The effect is much stronger in the case of a ban, and we also observe that the level
of substitution towards drugs other than antidepressants would be much higher in the case of such a ban
than the substitution resulting from the warning.
Our work adds some empirical evidence on the role of information in physicians’ prescribing behavior.
Previous literature on prescribing behavior has addressed issues related to physician-induced demand (Mcguire
(2000), Dickstein (2016)) and its relationship to drug prices, patient copayments and the availability of generic
drugs, as well as physician learning (Ching (2010),Coscielli and Shum (2004), Crawford and Shum (2005),
Dickstein (2018), Janakiraman et al. (2009)). For example, Coscielli and Shum (2004) and Crawford and
Shum (2005) model the learning process of physicians with a dynamic discrete choice model on antiulcer
drugs. Dickstein (2018) develops a model where physicians sequentially search for the best match between
a patient and a drug, allowing for correlations across drugs in the learning process. Ching et al. (2013)
incorporates consumer learning and heterogeneity into a dynamic oligopoly model to examine the impact
of shortening the expected generic approval time. Ching and Lim (2020) models correlated learning where
Canadian patients/doctors can observe a statin’s efficacy in reducing cholesterol levels but are uncertain
about whether the drug can reduce heart-disease risks.
Our work also relates to the evidence on the role of physicians’ heterogeneity of skills, beliefs and preferences,
which has been documented recently (Berndt et al. (2015), Currie and Macleod (2017), Cutler et al. (2019),
Currie and Macleod (2020)). Currie and Macleod (2017) examine the decision-making of physicians. They
show that better decision-making improves birth outcomes by reducing C-section rates at the bottom of
the risk distribution and increasing them at the top of the distribution. Cutler et al. (2019) shows how
much regional variation in health-care expenditures in the US comes from patient demand-side factors as
opposed to physician supply-side factors. The results show that the most important factor is physician
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beliefs about treatment. They estimate that in Medicare, 35 percent of spending on end-of-life care and
12 percent of spending on care for heart-attack patients are associated with physician beliefs unsupported
by clinical evidence. Berndt et al. (2015) shows that many psychiatrists have significantly heterogeneous
prescription patterns and concentrate on distinct drugs. The authors find some evidence of a relationship
between prescription volumes and prescribing behavior that is consistent with a learning-by-doing model
among physicians. Stern and Trajtenberg (1998) show that the exercise of physician authority is likely to be
related to skills. Finally, Currie and Macleod (2020) investigate how physician diagnostic skills, tastes, and
beliefs impact physician decision-making. The authors use a model in which physician experimentation allows
for learning about the match quality between a particular drug and an individual in the case of antidepressant
medication.
While there is extensive literature on physicians’ learning and experimentation, papers studying the
role of new scientific evidence and public recommendations on physicians’ prescriptions are sparse. Some
have evaluated how prescriptions change after drug withdrawal. Collins et al. (2013) show that the Vioxx
withdrawal had both positive and negative effects for specific substitute drugs and led to an overall increase
in the usage of competing products. When a new drug is introduced, physicians need to learn about their
existence and efficacy. Ferreyra and Kosenok (2011) show that physicians’ initial pessimism and uncertainty
can have large negative effects on their propensity to prescribe a new drug and on expected health outcomes.
Physician beliefs are crucial to explaining their heterogeneous prescribing behavior (Berndt et al. (2015))
and are also directly affected by both scientific knowledge and personal experience with their patients. Our
new approach and results shed light on how to evaluate the impact of medical warnings on physicians and
on their wide heterogeneity of responses.
In Section 2, we first present some background descriptive information on antidepressants, public health
warnings and recommendations, the data and some stylized descriptive statistics. Section 3 presents our
model and identification strategy. Section 4 shows the results of the empirical estimation on antidepressants
and depression treatment in France, and section 5 concludes.
4
2 Institutional Background, Data and Stylized Facts
2.1 Depression and Antidepressants
Depression affects 20% of French residents during their lifetimes. According to the World Health Organization,
it is the leading cause of ill health and disability worldwide (James et al. (2018)). It is also costly because
patients suffer from a decrease in their productivity. More than 60% of depressed people have symptoms severe
enough to keep them from performing daily tasks (Kessler et al. (2003)). Depression also increases suicide
attempts and hence mortality: the risk of suicide is 13-30 times higher among depressed people than among
nondepressed people, and suicide is among the top leading causes of death in high-income countries (and is
the second leading cause of death among 15-to-29-year-olds1). Finally, depression also increases health-care
expenditures. Depressed people visit their generalist care providers for somatic complaints three times more
often than nondepressed people (Kessler et al. (2003)).
The most commonly used modern antidepressant are those from the second generation, which generally
dominate those from the first generation of medicines. The only first-generation antidepressants still used
are those in the category of tricyclic antidepressants (TCAs), with the active ingredients amitriptyline,
clomipramine, dosulepin, imipramine, maprotiline, and trimipramine. Molecules of the second generation
are classified into three distinct subclasses according to their effect on the concentration of serotonin and
norepinephrine in the brain. These subclasses are selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), with the
active ingredients citalopram, escitalopram, fluoxetine, paroxetine, and sertraline; serotonin-norepinephrine
reuptake inhibitors (SNRIs), with the molecules milnacipran and venlafaxine; and "other antidepressants",
which include medicines with the molecules mianserine, mirtazapine and tianeptine.
2.2 Health Care System
Health insurance is mandatory in France, and all residents are automatically enrolled in the insurance system
depending on their occupational status under the French national health insurance system. A total of 90%
of the population has supplementary health insurance to cover benefits not covered under mandatory health
insurance. Even though health insurance plans differ across occupational groups, they are all regulated under
the same statutory framework (Rodwin (2003)). As in the case of the Italian market, discussed by Crawford
and Shum (2005), plans cannot compete by lowering insurance premiums, and physicians have uniform
1https://www.who.int/en/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/depression
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per-visit payments that attenuate the agency problem, which may come into play in the case of a market
with heterogeneous third-party payers. The heterogeneous constraints on physicians’ choices induced by drug
formularies in the US market do not come into play in the French market.
2.3 Scientific Information Release
Authorities such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the US or other health authorities in European
countries monitor the use of drugs and outcomes in terms of public health to check and evaluate the efficacy and
scrutinize the side effects or unintended effects of drugs, even after drugs are authorized and marketed. When
new scientific evidence appears after drug introductions, it is usually diffused through scientific publications
and then taken into account by health authorities in their recommendations to prescribers. In France,
the pubic health authority, currently named ANSM (Agence Nationale de Sécurité du Médicament), is in
charge of authorizing drugs and of regulating the use of prescription drugs by giving usage conditions and
recommendations to physicians.
We collected all the information on the recommendations of the French authority on antidepressant usage.
We also examined the US FDA recommendations and warnings as well as the medical literature to verify
whether the French health authority was giving all relevant information that could influence physicians. These
data show that recommendations and warnings between 2000 and 2008 usually occur in France around the
same time as they do in the US and closely follow the medical literature. All important scientific news is
monitored by these agencies and processed into official warnings and recommendations. During the period
examined in this study, three important warnings were released. The first recommended not prescribing
SSRI-type antidepressants to children and adolescents and was issued in December 2004 in France (a few
weeks after the US FDA warning). The second one, released in June 2006, partially contradicted the 2004
warning by recommending Prozac (the fluoxetine molecule of the SSRI group) for use by adolescents and
children above 8 years of age with moderate to severe depression. Finally, another warning was released in
February 2008 for three different molecules that were deemed not effective enough to be prescribed except in
the case of severe depression. These varying warnings also reflect the scientific debate about the role of SSRI
drugs in depression treatment and their relationship with suicide, as shown in Gibbons et al. (2006), Gibbons
et al. (2007) and Ludwig et al. (2009). Thus, although the health authorities’ warnings and recommendations
may clearly recommend not prescribing SSRIs to children and adolescents, this debate and the posterior
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evidence show that it is conceivable that physicians had knowledge that may not align with recommendations,
leading them not to follow recommendations.
In the context of these warnings released by the French health authority from the beginning of 2000 to the
end of 2008, we are particularly interested in the impact of the warning on December 2004, which informed
physicians that they should not prescribe SSRIs to children and adolescents under 18 due to the association
of such drugs with an increase in suicidal thinking at this age. We focus on the period from January 2000 to
June 2006 to avoid contamination from the June 2006 warning.
2.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We use a large panel data set on the exhaustive prescriptions made by 386 general practitioners to all of their
patients in France between 2000 and 2008. This proprietary data set was provided by CEGEDIM, a global
technology and services company specializing in health care. The data contain information on physicians,
patients and patient visits. At the physician level, the data set includes age, gender and region of operation.
At the patient level, it includes sociodemographic information (age, gender, employment) and information
on health (chronic diseases, height, weight). The data include all information recorded at physician visits,
including diagnoses, prescriptions, and exam results transmitted to the physician. Thus, we observe the
diagnosis and all drugs and treatments (drug, dosage, renewal) that were prescribed by the physician on each
visit. The unique patient- and physician-anonymized identification numbers allow us to follow physicians and
patients during the nine years that the data cover, unless patients changed to general practitioners.
Table 2.1: Share of Drugs Prescribed for Depression Diagnoses
Group All Children and Young Adults Adults Elderly People
Ages Ado. (2-18) (18-25) (26-65) (65+)
SSRIs 0.50 0.50 0.58 0.52 0.43
SNRIs 0.09 0.05 0.10 0.10 0.06
TCAs 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.11
Other Antidepressants 0.11 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.15
Other Drugs 0.23 0.33 0.23 0.22 0.25
No. of Visits 517,241 2,564 16,795 372,406 125,441
Table 2.1 shows the shares of each drug prescription for depression diagnoses. SSRIs are the most
commonly prescribed antidepressants. Across all age groups, more than 50% of the patients receive an SSRI-
type antidepressant prescription upon depression diagnosis. The prescription rate of "other drugs" that are
not antidepressants ranges from 22% for adults to 33% for children and adolescents.
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Next, Table 2.2 shows the shares of drug prescriptions for depression diagnoses for the periods before and
after the warning about SSRIs in 2004. For all age groups, the share of SSRI-type antidepressant prescriptions
decreases after the warning, with the largest decrease being in prescriptions for children and adolescents, from
51% to 46%. It is striking to see that this decrease is far from an exact compliance with the warning and that
the warning also leads to decreases in other age categories. While prescribing fewer SSRI drugs, physicians
switch to other antidepressants and to drugs other than antidepressants. For children and adolescents, the
share of "other drugs" increases by 10 percentage points after the warning, whereas for other age groups, the
share of SNRI-type antidepressants and "other drugs" both increase by 2 to 4 percentage points. However,
these averages mask large heterogeneity across physicians.
Table 2.2: Drug Prescription Average Probabilities – Before and After the Warning
Group All Children and Young Adults Adults Elderly People
Ages Ado. (2-18) (19-25) (26-65) (65+)
Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After
SSRIs 0.51 0.48 0.51 0.46 0.59 0.54 0.53 0.50 0.44 0.42
SNRIs 0.09 0.11 0.05 0.03 0.09 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.05 0.08
TCAs 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.12 0.10
Oth. Antidep. 0.11 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.15 0.14
Oth. Drugs 0.22 0.24 0.31 0.41 0.22 0.26 0.21 0.23 0.24 0.26
Table 2.3 shows the 25%, the median and the 75% quantiles across physicians of the prescription probability
of each drug class. We observe a substantial level of heterogeneity across physicians. For instance, for children
and adolescents, 25% of the physicians prescribe an SSRI less than 25% of the time when they diagnose
depression, whereas 25% prescribe an SSRI more than 67% of the time when they diagnose depression. We
observed heterogeneity in physicians’ prescribing behavior for other age groups as well.
Table 2.3: Quantiles of Average Prescription Probabilities Across Physicians
Group All Children and Young Adults Adults Elderly People
Ages Adolescents (18-25) (26-65) (65+)
Quantiles Quantiles Quantiles Quantiles Quantiles
25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75%
SSRIs 0.42 0.49 0.55 0.25 0.47 0.67 0.44 0.55 0.66 0.44 0.50 0.58 0.34 0.43 0.53
SNRIs 0.06 0.10 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.15 0.07 0.11 0.16 0.02 0.06 0.11
TCAs 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.08 0.15
Oth. Antidep. 0.06 0.09 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.08 0.12 0.07 0.12 0.19
Oth. Drugs 0.17 0.22 0.30 0.14 0.31 0.53 0.15 0.22 0.32 0.16 0.22 0.28 0.15 0.23 0.33
Table 2.4 reports the quantiles of prescription probabilities separately for the periods before and after the
SSRI warning in 2004. We see that the probability of prescribing SSRIs decreases at each quantile for every
age group. However, there is still a substantial level of heterogeneity across physicians even after the warning.
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For instance, for children and adolescents, the value for the first quartile for SSRI prescription probability is
20% before the warning and 0% after the warning. This shows that at least 25% of physicians never prescribe
SSRIs to children and adolescents after the warning, thus following the recommendation perfectly. Similarly,
the value for the third quartile is 73% before the warning and decreases to 67% after the warning. Moreover,
the average prescription probabilities for SNRIs and TCAs also decrease for a large part of the distribution,
as many physicians stop prescribing SNRIs and TCAs and increase their prescriptions of drugs other than
antidepressants, which are mainly drugs approved for other mental disorders and that are used off-label
for depression treatment. It thus seems that the warning on SSRIs does not simply reduce prescriptions of
SSRIs that would be substituted by other drugs in equal proportion to the prescription probability before
the warning. In contrast, the reduction of SSRI prescriptions is accompanied by a reduction of SNRI and
TCA prescriptions for many physicians, with an increase in other drug prescriptions. Such a pattern may
come from the fact that patients are heterogeneous and physicians have different preferences on how different
depressed patients should be treated in the absence of treatment with SSRI drugs. Our modeling of treatment
decisions by physicians will thus try to disentangle the effect of physician preferences from that of patient
heterogeneity.
Table 2.4: Quantiles of Average Prescription Probabilities Across Physicians Before and After the Warning
Group All Children and Young Adults Adults Elderly People
Ages Adolescents (18-25) (26-65) (65+)
Quantiles Quantiles Quantiles Quantiles Quantiles
25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75%
SSRIs Before 0.43 0.50 0.57 0.20 0.50 0.73 0.45 0.58 0.70 0.45 0.52 0.59 0.33 0.44 0.55
After 0.40 0.47 0.54 0.00 0.44 0.67 0.36 0.52 0.66 0.42 0.49 0.57 0.32 0.42 0.54
SNRIs Before 0.04 0.07 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.12 0.04 0.08 0.13 0.01 0.03 0.08
After 0.08 0.11 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.17 0.08 0.13 0.18 0.02 0.07 0.14
TCAs Before 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.03 0.09 0.17
After 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.13
Oth. Before 0.07 0.10 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.04 0.12 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.07 0.12 0.21
Antidep. After 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.10 0.04 0.07 0.12 0.06 0.10 0.19
Oth. Before 0.16 0.21 0.29 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.12 0.20 0.33 0.15 0.20 0.28 0.13 0.23 0.32
Drugs After 0.18 0.23 0.32 0.15 0.45 0.71 0.14 0.25 0.38 0.17 0.22 0.30 0.15 0.24 0.35
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3 Discrete Choice Model and Identification of Preference Change
3.1 Discrete Choice Model with Unobserved Heterogeneity
We develop a discrete choice model of antidepressant prescriptions of physicians for each patient diagnosed
with depression. We assume that each physician i receives patient j with some depression state that the
physician is able to observe. In a given sample period, a physician has J patients diagnosed with depression
(J does not need to be the same across physicians). We examine the physician prescription choices at time
t(j) when depression is diagnosed for patient j. We use all prescriptions over the sample period if a patient
has multiple depression spells. We abstract from questions over within-patient learning that relate to the
fact that when depression is diagnosed for the first time, physicians still have not learned any patient-specific
responses to treatments. For follow-up depression treatments, learning about the patient’s response to each
drug may play a role in a physician’s choice of treatment, but when we select only the first depression-related
visit for each patient, we obtain estimates of physician preferences that are highly correlated with those
obtained using all patient visits. Learning may still occur, but our approach only allows for the modeling and
identification of the effect of the warning with heterogeneity across physicians, not accounting for possible
within-patient learning.
Each physician i (she) can choose to prescribe some antidepressant d to patient j depending on the
characteristics of the patient (he) θj and on her own taste or preference parameter, denoted βtid, for drug d at
period t. The patient characteristics θj may include observable characteristics and unobservable characteristics,
such as his depression state. Note that in the context of France, the very large majority of patients are fully
reimbursed. We thus do not consider the price of drugs as a determinant of this choice, although this is a
testable assumption.
We assume that the utility of prescription decisions depends on physician preferences and patient char-
acteristics, including his depression state. Each physician can choose among D + 1 treatments, indexed by
d = 0, 1, .., D, and we assume that the decision by physician i to prescribe treatment d for patient j is based
on maximizing
v(βt(j)id , θj)− εijd (3.1)
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where v(., .) is nondecreasing in both arguments and εijd is an individual idiosyncratic deviation for treatment d
perceived by physician i and specific to patient j. The random term εijd allows decisions to be nondeterministic
functions of the patient depression state θj assessed by the physician. We normalize v (βti0, θj) = 0, where by
convention treatment 0 corresponds to drugs other than antidepressants.
We denote as yij ∈ {0, 1, .., D} the treatment chosen by physician i for patient j. Using (3.1) and the
assumption that εijd are i.i.d. type-I extreme value, the probability that physician i prescribes treatment d
to patient j is
P (yij = d|βt(j)id , θj) =
exp(v(βt(j)id , θj))
1 +
∑D
d˜=1 exp(v(β
t(j)
id˜
, θj))
We observe many patients and physicians, which implies that we can identify averages of these probabilities
in the population. Such identification needs to account for the fact that patients who visit a given physician
may have heterogeneous distributions of health that is possibly correlated with physicians’ preferences for
treatments. This could come from common unobserved correlated effects or from patients having some
information on physicians’ abilities and preferences. Thus, the cumulative distribution of patients’ θj may
not be identical across physicians, and we allow it to depend on the physician preferences βtid and on the
period t.
Denoting as F (θj |βtid, t) the cumulative distribution function of θj conditional on the physician preferences
βtid during t, the probability that a physician i prescribes drug d to a patient is an average of the conditional
probability to each patient type, with
P (yij = d|βt(j)id = βtid, t) =
∫ exp(v(βtid, θj))
1 +
∑D
d˜=1 exp(v(βtid˜, θj))
dF (θj |βt(j)i = βtid, t)
which is a function of physician preferences βtid. Matching between patients and physicians generates some
possible dependence in the cumulative distribution function F (θj |βt(j)i = βtid, t). However, even if patients
are randomized to physicians such that F (θj |βt(j)i = βtid, t) = F (θj), it remains the case that the prescription
probability depends on the distribution function F (θj) and on the preferences of physician i. Disentangling the
distribution of unobserved heterogeneity θj from this mixture model is a difficult problem of deconvolution.
However, we show below how we can separately identify the change in preferences and patient heterogeneity
by assuming that the distribution of patient characteristics is stable over time and that physician preferences
βtid may only change between the period before the warning occurs at time t1 and after. We thus assume
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that:
βtid = β0id if t ≤ t1 (before warning) (3.2)
= β1id if t > t1 (after warning)
Denoting as τ (j) = 1{t(j)>t1} the dummy variable for whether patient j visits physician i before or after the
warning, we define the physician preference for drug d before the warning ω0dij ≡ v(β0id, θj) and the change
in preferences for drug d due to the warning ω1dij ≡ v(β1id, θj)− v(β0id, θj) such that:
v(βt(j)id , θj) = v(β
0
id, θj)(1− τ(j)) + v(β1id, θj)τ(j)
≡ ω0dij + ω1dijτ(j)
This implies that the probability that physician i prescribes d to a patient θj at time period τ(j) is:
P (yij = d|i, j, τ(j)) =
exp(ω0dij + ω1dijτ(j))
1 +
∑D
d˜=1 exp(ω0d˜ij + ω
1
d˜ij
τ(j))
and the average probability for physician i to prescribe d is then:
P (yij = d|i, τ(j)) =
∫ exp(ω0dij + ω1dijτ(j))
1 +
∑D
d˜=1 exp(ω0d˜ij + ω
1
d˜ij
τ(j))
dF (ω01ij , ω11ij , .., ω0Dij , ω1Dij |i, τ(j))
Although the warning concerns only one of the drugs d, we allow all utilities for each drug to be affected by
the warning, as it is possible that the new information also affects the physician’s beliefs about other drugs.
Now, we also assume that the distribution of patients’ unobservable characteristics, such as their health
state, are identical before and after the warning, that is,
F (θj |i, t ≤ t1) = F (θj |i, t > t1)
or equivalently
F (ω01ij , ω11ij , .., ω0Dij , ω1Dij |i, τ(j) = 0) = F (ω01ij , ω11ij , .., ω0Dij , ω1Dij |i, τ(j) = 1) (3.3)
This means the differences in treatment before and after the warning for a patient with characteristics θj comes
only from the change in preferences of the physician. The fact that the distribution of θj is identical before
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and after the warning for a given physician implies that there will be no change in prescription probability
at the physician level before and after the warning if preferences do not change. Indeed, if β0id = β1id for ∀d,
then ω1dij = v(β1id, θj)− v(β0id, θj) = 0 and
P (yij = d|i, τ(j) = 0) =
∫ exp(ω0dij)
1 +
∑D
d˜=1 exp(ω0d˜ij+)
dF (ω01ij , ω11ij , .., ω0Dij , ω1Dij |i) = P (yij = d|i, τ(j) = 1)
This shows that we can identify the change in physician preferences due to the drug warning using
the stability condition of preferences before and after the warning (3.2) and the stability condition of the
distribution of patient states for each physician before and after the warning (3.3). The model thus allows, for
example, an endogenous patient and physician matching process such that physicians receive heterogeneous
distributions of patients.
3.2 Econometric specification
To estimate the model, we need to specify a parametric distribution for unobservables. We assume that the
ω01ij , ω
1
1ij , .., ω
0
Dij , ω
1
Dij are independent across alternatives d, that is
F
(
ω01ij , ω
1
1ij , .., ω
0
Dij , ω
1
Dij |i
)
=
∏D
d=1
F
(
ω0dij , ω
1
dij |i
)
and F (.) is jointly normal with
(
ω0dij , ω
1
dij
) iid∼ N

 α0di
α1di
 ,
 σ2di0 ρdi
ρdi σ
2
di1


where we allow some nonzero correlation between ω0dij and ω1dij , implying that we allow the change in
physician i’s preference for drug d due to the warning ω1dij to be correlated with the physician’s preference
before the warning ω0dij .
This implies that we obtain a discrete choice model that corresponds to a random coefficient discrete
choice logit for each physician i. While we add these functional form restrictions for practical estimation,
McFadden and Train (2000) show that mixed logit (random coefficient logit) models are flexible enough
to approximate any discrete choice model. The conditional choice probability that physician i chooses
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(yi1 = d1, yi2 = d2, .., yiJ = dJ) for her J patients is
∏J
j=1
P (yij = d|i, τ (j))
where
P (yij = d|i, τ (j)) =
∫ exp(ω0dij + ω1dijτ (j))
1 +
∑D
d˜=1 exp
(
ω0
d˜ij
+ ω1
d˜ij
τ (j)
) ∏D
d˜=1
dF
(
ω0
d˜ij
, ω1
d˜ij
|α0
d˜i
, α1
d˜i
, σ2di0, σ
2
d˜i1, ρd˜i
)
(3.4)
With a large number of patients J per physician, we can identify the parameters α0di, α1di, σ2di0, σ2di1, ρdi
for all physicians i = 1, .., I. Thus, if α0di 6= α1di or σdi0 6= σdi1, it will mean that physician preferences have
changed with the warning.
We can then define the marginal effect of the changes in preferences of physician i on each prescription
probability to patient j as
∆P (yij = d|i, j) ≡
exp(ω0dij + ω1dij)
1 +
∑D
d˜=1 exp(ω0d˜ij + ω
1
d˜ij
)
− expω
0
dij
1 +
∑D
d˜=1 expω0d˜ij
and after identifying the parameters α0di, α1di, σ2di0, σ2di1, ρdi for all physicians, we can obtain any moment
or quantile of the distribution of the marginal effect on the prescription of drug d both within and across
physicians. For example, the average marginal effect on the prescription of drug d for physician i is
∆P
(
yij = d|(α0di, α1di, σ2di0, σ2di1ρdi)d=1,..,D
)
(3.5)
≡
∫  exp(ω0dij + ω1dij)
1 +
∑D
d˜=1 exp(ω0d˜ij + ω
1
d˜ij
)
− expω
0
dij
1 +
∑D
d˜=1 expω0d˜ij
 dF ((ω0
d˜ij
, ω1
d˜ij
)d˜=1,..,D |(α0d˜i, α1d˜i, σ2d˜i0, σ2d˜i1, ρd˜i)d˜=1,..,D
)
The heterogeneity across physicians of parameters α0di, α1di, σ2di0, σ2di1, ρdi combines the potential het-
erogeneity of behavior of physicians and the potential heterogeneity of patients across physicians, which
cannot be disentangled without additional assumptions. For example, before the warning, the heterogeneity
of the distribution of ω0
d˜ij
across physicians i cannot be interpreted as heterogeneity of physician preferences
because it combines the heterogeneity of physicians with the unobserved heterogeneity of patients, unless
we add some specific untestable assumptions on the matching between patients and physicians. However,
assuming stability of the distribution of patients for a given physician before and after the warning is a
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weaker assumption, allowing us to interpret differences in the distributions of ω0dij and ω1dij as changes in
preferences for a given physician.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Model Estimates
We thus implement the estimation of this random coefficient logit model for each physician. We consider the
alternative choices of antidepressant classes as SNRIs, SSRIs, TCAs, and “other antidepressants” (mianserine,
mirtazapine, tianeptine) while the category “other drugs” is the normalized outside option and gathers drugs
that are not antidepressants. The latter are mostly drugs not approved for depression treatment but used
off-label in depression treatment by physicians. These drugs are mostly antipsychotics (i.e. olanzapine) or
anxiolytics (i.e., alprazolam, bromazepam, prazepam). The discrete choice model thus has 5 alternatives that
almost all physicians prescribe2, and we ignore coprescriptions, which represent less than 3% of depression
treatments.
We allow the patient’s observable characteristics, such as gender (gj) and age (aj) to affect the mean
utility of the discrete choice model by specifying the joint distribution of random coefficients as follows:
(
ω0dij , ω
1
dij
) iid∼ N

 α0di (gj , aj)
α1di (gj , aj)
 ,
 σ2di0 ρdi
ρdi σ
2
di1


where
α0di (gj , aj) = α0di + α
g
digj + α
a
diaj
α1di (gj , aj) = α1di + α
g
digj + α
a
diaj
The estimation of the random coefficient logit model thus has 8 random effects ω0dij , ω1dij for d = 1, 2, 3, 4
at the patient level j and 28 parameters αadi, α1di, α0di, α
g
di, σdi0, σdi1, ρdi for d = 1, 2, 3, 4 for each physician
i = 1, .., 386. For 48 physicians, the model parameters cannot be estimated even with added restrictions
because of the existence of too few patients with depression diagnoses. Thus, for 91 physicians, the correlation
ρdi is very imprecisely estimated, with a very large standard error, in which case we estimate the same model
2Among all the physicians, only 3 never prescribe an SNRI, 8 never prescribe a TCA and only one never uses other
antidepressants. All of the physicians prescribe SSRIs.
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with the additional restriction of no-correlation (ρdi = 0). For an additional subset of 32 physicians, the
variance coefficients σdi0 or σdi1 are too imprecisely estimated, in which case we also impose that σdi0 = 0 and
σdi1 = 0. As a result, there are no restrictions on parameters for the remaining 215 physicians. We thus obtain
all parameter estimates for 338 physicians (we have imposed ρdi = 0 for 91 of them and ρdi = σdi0 = σdi1 = 0
for 32).
Table 4.1 reports the results of this random coefficient model for one of the physicians. The results
show that the warning makes this physician’s preference towards SSRIs decrease, as α1di is significantly
negative for SSRIs, and that the warning increases his preference towards SNRIs, as α1di is positive for SNRIs
albeit significant only at the 10% level. The parameter σ0di is positive and significant, showing that there is
large heterogeneity in treatments before the warning. This heterogeneity is not surprising and is due to the
heterogeneity of patients for this physician. The parameter σ1di is also positive, showing, for example, that
this physician’s preferences are affected by the warning such that her decision utility for SSRIs has an even
larger variance after the warning, and the parameter ρdi being positive for SSRIs shows that the larger the
variance before the warning, the larger it is after. As a result, this physician decreases SSRI prescriptions after
the warning and substitutes towards SNRIs and the reference alternative, “other drugs”. The distribution of
estimated parameters across all physicians is provided in Table A.1 in the appendix.
Table 4.1: Random Coefficient Logit Estimation for a Single Physician i
Patient’s Baseline Warning
Age Gender Mean SD Mean SD Correlation
Drugs: αgdi αadi α0di σdi0 α1di σdi1 ρdi
SSRIs -0.07 -0.47 4.04 3.21 -1.86 8.26 0.93
(.01) (.39) (.66) (.36) (.52) (1.35) (.99)
SNRIs -0.06 0.19 1.85 3.24 0.78 5.30 -1.58
(.01) (.45) (.74) (.33) (.47) (1.08) (.96)
TCAs -0.01 -0.29 -2.64 2.77 0.83 4.49 0.56
(.02) (.61) (1.18) (.41) (.99) (1.58) (.71)
Other Antidep. -0.18 -0.36 6.02 3.45 -2.69 7.55 6.49
(.04) (.60) (1.59) (.42) (1.38) (2.46) (1.98)
No. of visits 1397
Notes: A negative gender coefficient means that the physician has a lower preference for this drug for female patients (dummy is
1 for female and 0 for male). Standard errors in parentheses.
The parameter estimates of the warning effect by physician are then informative about how each physician’s
preferences change with the warning, while those on demographics possibly mix the heterogeneity of physician
preferences with the sorting of patients into physician practices based on the heterogeneity of patient states.
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As all parameters change with the warning, it is easier to look at changes in prescription probabilities, as we
do in the following.
4.2 Effects of the warning on choice probabilities
Using the model estimates, we can now predict the choice probabilities before and after the warning for
each physician for any patient of any age and gender group. Table 4.2 reports the quantiles of prescription
probability for each choice alternative before and after warning preferences. These predicted probabilities
should be equal to those in Table 2.4 if there is no estimation error and if the model specification is correct.
We can see that the results are similar, although our model imposes the restrictions that age and gender
can affect only the mean utilities and not the variance. This shows that the choice modeling allows us to
replicate moments of the physician-level choice probability distribution. As we can see below, the model also
allows us to identify the physician-level heterogeneity of prescriptions within her set of patients. We observe a
substantial level of heterogeneity across physicians, not only in terms of initial prescription probabilities but
also in their responses to the warning. For instance, for children and adolescents, for 25% of the physicians,
the before-warning probability of prescribing SSRIs is less than 0.41, whereas for 25%, it is more than 0.64.
We also observe heterogeneity in terms of their response to the warning. At every quantile, the probability
of prescribing SSRIs decreases for every age group. However, for children, adolescents and young adults,
the decrease grows larger as the quantile grows larger, in terms of both percentage and percentage points,
suggesting that the physicians prescribing SSRIs more often before the warning decrease their prescriptions
more after the warning. We can also see that most of the substitution is towards SNRI drugs.
Table 4.2: Heterogeneity across Physicians of Average Prescription Probabilities Before/After Warning
Group All Children and Young Adults Adults Elderly People
Ages Adolescents (18-25) (26-65) (65+)
Quantiles (%) Quantiles (%) Quantiles (%) Quantiles (%) Quantiles (%)
25 50 75 25 50 75 25 50 75 25 50 75 25 50 75
SSRIs Bef. 0.40 0.48 0.54 0.41 0.52 0.64 0.41 0.52 0.62 0.40 0.48 0.56 0.33 0.41 0.50
Aft. 0.34 0.42 0.48 0.36 0.45 0.55 0.36 0.45 0.53 0.34 0.42 0.49 0.3 0.38 0.46
SNRIs Bef. 0.06 0.10 0.14 0.05 0.10 0.18 0.06 0.10 0.16 0.06 0.10 0.15 0.05 0.08 0.14
Aft. 0.08 0.14 0.22 0.07 0.15 0.23 0.07 0.15 0.23 0.08 0.14 0.22 0.07 0.13 0.20
TCAs Bef. 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.10 0.17
Aft. 0.01 0.06 0.11 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.02 0.07 0.15
Oth. Bef. 0.07 0.11 0.16 0.03 0.07 0.13 0.03 0.08 0.14 0.06 0.10 0.15 0.07 0.13 0.20
Antidep. Aft. 0.06 0.11 0.18 0.03 0.09 0.16 0.03 0.09 0.17 0.05 0.11 0.18 0.06 0.13 0.21
Oth. Bef. 0.16 0.22 0.28 0.12 0.19 0.28 0.13 0.19 0.28 0.16 0.21 0.27 0.15 0.22 0.30
Drugs Aft. 0.18 0.22 0.29 0.16 0.22 0.29 0.16 0.22 0.29 0.18 0.22 0.29 0.17 0.22 0.29
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We then also compute the change after the warning in the prescription probabilities for each drug
category and for each physician. Table 4.3 reports the quantiles across physicians for the change in prescription
probabilities. For all the age groups but the elderly, 25% of physicians decrease their probability of prescribing
SSRIs by at least 12 percentage points. For elderly patients, the 25% of physicians who decrease SSRI
prescriptions the most show a decrease of a maximum of 9 percentage points. In contrast, across all age
groups, 25% of the physicians either do not respond to the warning at all or increase their average probability
of prescribing SSRIs (the 75% quantile if +0.01). According to Tables 4.3 and 4.4, physicians who decrease
their prescriptions of SSRIs substitute towards SNRIs and “other drugs”.
Table 4.3: Heterogeneity across Physicians in Change in Prescription Probabilities due to the Warning
Group All Children and Young Adults Adults Elderly People
Ages Adolescents (18-25) (26-65) (65+)
Quantiles (%) Quantiles (%) Quantiles (%) Quantiles (%) Quantiles (%)
25 50 75 25 50 75 25 50 75 25 50 75 25 50 75
SSRIs -0.12 -0.05 0.01 -0.13 -0.06 0.01 -0.13 -0.06 0.00 -0.13 -0.05 0.00 -0.09 -0.03 0.04
SNRIs -0.02 0.04 0.10 -0.02 0.04 0.09 -0.02 0.04 0.10 -0.02 0.04 0.10 -0.02 0.04 0.10
TCAs -0.05 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.04 -0.01 0.03 -0.07 -0.02 0.02
Oth. Antidep. -0.05 0.00 0.05 -0.03 0.00 0.05 -0.03 0.00 0.05 -0.04 0.00 0.05 -0.06 -0.01 0.05
Oth. Drugs -0.02 0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.03 0.06 -0.02 0.02 0.06 -0.03 0.02 0.06 -0.03 0.01 0.06
Table 4.4 shows, for each drug class, the mean, median and standard deviation of the average across
patients of the physician-level prescription probability for the periods before and after the warning as well as
the within-physician changes in variance of prescription probabilities. It shows that the average probability
of prescribing SSRIs decreases with the warning by 5.3 percentage points. Physicians substitute away from
SSRIs towards SNRIs. It also shows that the heterogeneity across physicians increases after the warning
and increases more for other drug classes than SSRIs. It is as if the warning is interpreted differently by
heterogeneous physicians. We also observe an increase in the within-physician variance of the probability of
prescribing SSRIs or SNRIs, meaning that after the warning, physicians make less homogeneous decisions
across patients than before. The figures below help clarify the changes across the different drug categories.
Figure 4.1 plots the average physician prescription probability for all drugs with before-warning preferences
on the horizontal axis and after-warning preferences on the vertical axis. The first row reports the average
prescription probability by physician for all patients and the second row for only children and adolescents.
We see that with the warning, a majority of physicians decrease their SSRI prescriptions and increase their
SNRI prescriptions. We do not observe a clear trend for other choice alternatives. For instance, for TCAs and
“other antidepressants”, half of the physicians increase their prescriptions of these drugs after the warning,
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Table 4.4: Distribution of Physician Prescription Probabilities Before/After Warning
Across Physicians Within-Physician
Mean Standard Deviation Standard Deviation
Drug Before After Change Before After Change Before After Change
SSRIs 0.470 0.417 -0.053 0.111 0.117 0.006 0.354 0.388 0.034
SNRIs 0.106 0.152 0.046 0.065 0.101 0.036 0.209 0.268 0.059
TCAs 0.077 0.073 -0.004 0.052 0.074 0.022 0.185 0.179 -0.006
Oth. Antidep. 0.119 0.125 0.006 0.068 0.091 0.023 0.221 0.242 0.021
Oth. Drugs 0.227 0.241 0.014 0.093 0.103 0.010 0.248 0.305 0.057
Note: Mean and standard deviation across physicians in the first six columns and within-physician standard deviation of prescription
probabilities in the next three columns.
whereas the the other half decrease their prescriptions of these drugs. The figure shows substitution from
SSRIs towards SNRIs. For children and adolescents, we observe similar responses to the warning, except that
many more physicians substitute SSRIs with “other drugs”, not only with SNRIs.
Figure 4.1: Effect of Warning on Average Prescription Probability by Physician and Drug as Function of
Baseline Prescription Probability
Notes: Scatter plot of predicted physician-level prescription probability after the warning as a function of the before-warning prob-
ability. Each point represents a physician-level probability. The first row shows the mean choice probabilities for any patient, and
the second row shows the mean choice probabilities for children and adolescents.
Figure 4.2 shows the substitution patterns between SSRIs and other drugs using estimates of the marginal
effect of the warning on each probability as in equation (3.5). The left (right) panel plots, for each physician,
the change in the probability of prescribing SSRIs on the horizontal axis and the change in the probability of
prescribing SNRIs (“other-drugs”) on the vertical axis. Figure 4.2 plots the substitution patterns across all
patients and only for children and adolescents. The majority of the physicians are located in the upper-left
corner of the graph, meaning that they are the ones substituting away from SSRIs towards SNRIs and/or
19
“other drugs”. For children and adolescents, an even higher number of physicians are in the upper-left corner
of the graph.
Figure 4.2: Effect of Warning on Average Prescription Probability by Physician
Notes: Plots of changes in the physician-level mean probability of prescribing SSRIs versus SNRIs and “other drugs”.
As we have seen earlier, the warning affects not only the mean physician preference towards each drug but
also its variance, meaning that it affects the way physicians prescribe heterogeneously across patients. Figure
4.3 plots the within-physician variance of the prescription probability with before-warning preferences on the
horizontal axis and after-warning preferences on the vertical axis for all patients. The figure shows that the
physician-level variance in the probability of prescribing SSRIs increases for almost all physicians except for
those with a lower variance before the warning, who do not seem to be affected. This shows that the warning
does not lead physicians to prescribe uniformly across patients after the warning, and the second row of
graphs in Figure 4.3 shows that this is also true within the age category of children and adolescents. For a
majority of the physicians, the within-physician variance in the probability of prescribing SNRIs and “other
drugs” also increases after the warning. We do not see such a clear effect for other alternatives. For TCAs
and “other antidepressants”, the within-physician variance of the prescription probability slightly increases
for approximately half of the physicians and slightly decreases for the other half. We observe very similar
patterns for children and adolescents even though the warning concerns only and all the patients in this age
group. Contrary to what may have been expected, the warning does not lead to more uniform treatment
choices across physicians, probably because physicians are very heterogeneous ex ante and the effect of the
warning on their preferences also proves to be very heterogeneous.
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Figure 4.3: Effect of Warning on Within-Physician Variance of Prescription Probability
Notes: Scatter plot of physician-level variance of prescription probability after the warning as a function of the before-warning
probability. Each point represents one physician-level variance observation. The first row shows the variance of choice probabilities
for any patient, and the second row shows the variance of choice probabilities for children and adolescents.
Another way to examine the heterogeneity of the effects of the warning consists of looking at the changes
in the distribution of prescription probabilities across physicians depending on their before-warning choice
probability. Figures 4.4 and 4.5 plot these densities of the average change in physician prescription probability
by quartile of the ex ante prescription probability for all patients and for children and adolescents, respectively.
For SSRIs, the largest decrease in prescription probability after the warning is among physicians in the highest
quartile (quartile 4) in terms of ex ante probability of prescribing SSRIs. The smallest decrease is among
physicians in the lowest quartile (quartile 1). Similarly, the largest increase in the probability of prescribing
SNRIs and “other drugs” is among those who were prescribing those categories least often before the warning
(quartiles 1 and 2 in the figures for SNRIs and “other drugs”). The patterns are similar across all patients
and for children and adolescents only.
When looking at the correlation of the physician-level probabilities of prescribing any of these drug
categories with observable physician characteristics, we find no significant correlation with physician age
or gender but find some with the number of depressed patients per year seen by the physician. The only
significant correlations between prescription probabilities before and after the warning are for SSRIs and other
drugs. The more patients seen by a physician, the higher is her probability of prescribing SSRIs both before
and after the warning (without correlation with the change) and the lower her probability of prescribing
other drugs. We observe this correlation without any possibility of assessing causality that could go both
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ways; thus, the finding calls for more research on the long-term determinants of physician preferences and
abilities.
Figure 4.4: Effect on Prescription Probability by Quartile – All Ages
Notes: Kernel density estimates of physician-level changes in prescription probability by quartile of ex ante choice probability.
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Figure 4.5: Effect on Prescription Probability by Quartile – Children and Adolescents
Notes: Kernel density estimates of physician-level changes in prescription probability by quartile of ex ante choice probability.
4.3 Comparing the Effects of the Warning with Those of a Ban
In the previous section, we show that the warning on SSRIs on average reduces physician prescriptions of
SSRIs but also has very heterogeneous effects. Given that the warning was clear on the fact that SSRIs should
not be prescribed (or should only be prescribed as a last resort) to children and adolescents, we may consider
the possible effect of a complete ban like those sometimes imposed on drugs that are uniformly considered too
unsafe. This is what happened, for example, when the antiinflammatory Vioxx was pulled from the market.
We thus look at the counterfactual effects of a ban of SSRI drugs for children and adolescents to compare
physicians’ substitution of drug prescriptions. Of course, in the case of a ban, SSRI prescriptions to children
and adolescents would disappear, while the warning is far from yielding such an effect. A ban would also
annihilate the heterogeneity across physicians in the probabilities of prescribing SSRIs. That said, the model
still allows us to compare the changes in prescriptions of other drugs.
Banning SSRI drugs for use by children and adolescents could, however, not only change the ability to
prescribe SSRIs but also affect the preferences of physicians towards other drugs, just as the warning has
done. As we do not observe such a ban, we compare the effects of both the ban and the warning using the ex
ante and ex post physician preferences (before and after the warning).
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Our model allows us to simulate the prescription probabilities in the absence of SSRIs as follows. With
the same notation as in equation (3.4), the choice probability of any drug d that is not an SSRI based on
prewarning preferences is:
P (yij = d|i, τ (j) = 0,no SSRI) =
∫ exp(ω0dij)
1 +
∑
{d˜6=SSRI} exp(ω0d˜ij)
∏
{d˜6=SSRI} dF
(
ω0
d˜ij
|α0
d˜i
, σ2
d˜i0
)
(4.1)
while with postwarning preferences, it is:
P (yij = d|i, τ (j) = 1,no SSRI) =
∫ exp(ω1dij)
1 +
∑
{d˜6=SSRI} exp(ω1d˜ij)
∏
{d˜6=SSRI} dF
(
ω1
d˜ij
|α1
d˜i
, σ2
d˜i1
)
(4.2)
Table 4.5 shows the mean choice probability of each drug category with or without the ban using pre- or
postwarning preferences. Given that the decrease in SSRIs is obviously much larger under a ban, the ban
mostly leads to substitution to other non-antidepressant drugs rather than to SNRIs or other antidepressants.
The SSRI warning leads to a modest decrease in SSRI prescriptions, half of which is directed towards SNRI
drugs (see the last column of Table 4.5); however, while the ban on SSRIs leads to a much larger effect,
more than half of the decrease in SSRI prescriptions goes to drugs other than antidepressants. This means
that the ban on SSRI drugs has a very different effect from that of the SSRI warning. We can see that
the effect of the ban on SSRIs using postwarning preferences proportionately benefits other drugs more
(0.298/0.452=0.66 is larger than 0.322/0.517=0.62). Of course, the ban on SSRIs also has quite a different
effect on the within-physician variance of the prescription probability, as it lowers the variance in prescribing
SSRIs (since the probability of prescribing SSRIs becomes zero for any patient of any physician), while the
warning has the effect of increasing the variance.
Table 4.5: Effects of an SSRI Ban versus the Warning on Physician Prescription Probabilities (Children and
Adolescents (2-18))
With Prewarning Preferences With Postwarning Preferences Warning Only
No Ban With Ban Change No Ban With Ban Change Change
Drug P 0d P 0d,ban P 0d,ban − P 0d P 1d P 1d,ban P 1d,ban − P 1d P 1d − P 0d
SSRIs 0.517 0.000 −0.517 0.452 0.000 −0.452 −0.065
SNRIs 0.122 0.207 +0.085 0.158 0.231 +0.073 +0.036
TCAs 0.043 0.078 +0.035 0.048 0.075 +0.027 +0.005
Oth. Antidep. 0.101 0.176 +0.075 0.112 0.169 +0.057 +0.011
Oth. Drugs 0.215 0.537 +0.322 0.234 0.532 +0.298 +0.019
Notes: Column titles denote the mean prescription probability for any child or adolescent patient across all physicians. P 0d is the
mean prescription probability of drug d under prewarning preferences, and P 0d,ban is the mean prescription probability of drug
d under prewarning preferences when SSRIs are banned. P 1d and P
1
d,ban denote the same mean probabilities using postwarning
preferences.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we study how scientific information released by public authorities, such as a drug warning, affects
the prescribing behavior of physicians. As physician prescribing behavior may depend on both physician
preferences and on unobserved, possibly correlated characteristics of patients, we show that we cannot generally
disentangle the heterogeneity in physician preferences from the heterogeneity in patient characteristics.
However, using the long time dimension of panel data on physician prescriptions to a large set of patients
before and after a warning that may have affected physicians’ preferences, and assuming that the distribution
of patient heterogeneity is stable over time before and after the warning, we can identify the change in
preferences by allowing for physician-specific random effects in prescribing behavior.
Taking the example of antidepressant drugs, we use French panel data on exhaustive prescriptions of a
representative sample of general practitioners to more than 110,000 depressed patients between 2000 and
2008. Changing scientific evidence on the efficacy and side effects of drugs can result in official warnings
and recommendations. New results on the increase in suicidal thinking in children were reported in 2004
for selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs). We find that SSRI-type antidepressant prescriptions
decreased after 2004 for children and adolescents, but the physicians responded to the new information very
heterogeneously. We find that the drug warning increased the variance of physician prescribing behavior both
across physicians and within individual physicians. One important result is that the warning reduced the
probability of prescribing SSRIs to all patients in addition to children and adolescents and that this reduction
was larger but also more heterogeneous for physicians with a higher mean probability of prescribing SSRIs
before the warning. The method presented can be used to understand how physician behavior is affected by
scientific information, warnings, and the entry and exit of new drugs by using panel data and assuming that
the correlation between patients’ unobserved characteristics and physicians’ preferences is stable and not
affected by the event. Finally, we compare the effect of the SSRI warning with a possible removal of market
authorization for use of SSRIs by children and adolescents and show that not only is the magnitude of the
effect of the warning much lower than that of a removal but also the substitution towards alternative drugs is
very different. These results call into question the interpretation of drug warnings and recommendations by
physicians and show how heterogeneous reactions can occur in relationship to physicians’ ex ante preference
for the different possible treatments.
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A Appendix
A.1 Full Model Estimates Table
Table A.1 reports the distribution of all coefficient estimates of the model across the 386 physicians.
Table A.1: Distribution of Coefficient Estimates Across Physicians
Quantiles
Drugs Baseline parameters 25 % 50 % 75 %
SSRIs Age αgdi -0.04 -0.01 0.01
Gender αadi -0.62 0.07 0.81
Constant α0di 0.30 1.55 3.06
Std Deviation σdi0 2.41 3.12 4.10
SNRIs Age αgdi -0.05 -0.01 0.02
Gender αadi -1.31 0.01 1.19
Constant α0di -5.60 -2.75 -0.66
Std Deviation σdi0 2.64 3.43 5.04
TCAs Age αgdi 0.01 0.04 0.09
Gender αadi -1.54 0.03 1.77
Constant α0di -12.8 -7.73 -4.13
Std Deviation σdi0 2.92 4.15 6.12
Other Antidep. Age αgdi -0.02 0.02 0.06
Gender αadi -1.48 -0.35 0.58
Constant α0di -6.81 -3.32 -0.95
Std Deviation σdi0 2.50 3.46 4.74
Warning effects
SSRIs Mean α1di -0.91 -0.28 0.47
Std Deviation σdi1 1.20 2.17 3.54
Correlation ρdi -0.46 0.00 0.56
SNRIs Mean α1di -4.47 -1.07 0.48
Std Deviation σdi1 1.21 2.94 6.05
Correlation ρdi -0.51 0.00 1.10
TCAs Mean α1di -9.41 -3.04 -0.30
Std Deviation σdi1 0.61 1.96 4.10
Correlation ρdi -0.37 0.00 1.46
Other Antidep. Mean α1di -4.82 -1.78 -0.17
Std Deviation σdi1 0.69 1.92 4.10
Correlation ρdi -0.46 0.00 0.83
Notes: Coefficients of random coefficient logits with 338 physician-specific coefficients. Correlation coefficients ρdi are not identified
and thus restricted to zero for 91 physicians, and all random coefficients are not identified and thus are restricted to zero for 32
physicians. From the original sample, 48 physicians do not have enough visits with depression to be included in the model.
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